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Euro Crisis 
 
Summary: It is argued the current eurozone crisis is neither new nor surpris-
ing. Fiscal discipline in the eurozone was weak from its creation in 1999, but
ongoing economic prosperity limited the damage. Economic recession deep-
ened the impact of crisis on public finance and pushed some eurozone coun-
tries to the edge of bankruptcy. Options available now are costly and painful:
foreign bailouts, cuts to expenditures, higher revenues and some combination
of the three. They may be conducted both inside and outside the eurozone. If
eurozone problems are not solved, financial markets may turn down the euro 
as a currency, possibly marking the beginning of Euro-disintegration.
Key words: Eurozone, Euro, Fiscal discipline, Reform of public finance, Bail-
outs, Default, Bankruptcy. 
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In February 2010, the press in Europe and the United States was literally plagued 
with articles on the crisis of the euro. The threat emerged from some countries’ high 
indebtedness and doubts of their ability to service debt, what again may undermine 
the euro. At the spot market the currency fell against its main rivals. The media 
promptly coined the acronym PIIGS, to designate main troublemakers in the euro-
zone - Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain. A sudden rise in the number of arti-
cles related to the crisis of euro gives an impression the problems are surprising and 
recent.
1 In this article I argue they are neither surprising nor recent. Further, I argue 
the euro is a highly politicized currency, making troubles larger rather than smaller. 
Problems with euro stability existed from the beginning, i.e. from its incep-
tion. Poor fiscal policies in some eurozone countries, along with the European Cen-
tral Bank’s (ECB) and European Union (EU) authorities’ inability to discipline 
members in the zone - such as either keeping the rules or enforcing fines for viola-
tions - contributed to such stability problems.
2 During prosperous years (1999-2008), 
fiscal escalation in the eurozone was moderate to excessive. The economic recession 
of 2008-2010 undermined public finances, while governments have not adjusted pub-
lic spending to reduced financial potential. Public finance troubles escalated in nearly 
all euro countries, while the stigma fell on the PIIGS only. The PIIGS are probably in 
the inferior position now, but they are not the only eurozone members with troubled 
public finances.    
                                                        
1 It may be problematic for some authors to explain what happens now in the European Monetary Union 
(EMU), because the mainstream in the field - for example, Desmond Dinan (2003), Ali M. El-Agraa 
(2007) - ignored early troubles in the eurozone and behaved basically completely uncritical in presenta-
tion and discussion of the EU policies. Neglecting previous troubles, it is difficult to say what is going on 
now.  
2 What happens now in the eurozone is not surprising to authors that spoke about euro troubles before, cf. 
Neil Nugent (2003), Miroslav Prokopijević (2005, 2009).  370  Miroslav Prokopijević 
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1. Irregular Beginning 
 
The idea for a common European currency area was launched at the summit of the 
European Community (EC)/EU leaders in The Hague in 1969. As with many other 
common policies, decades elapsed before common currency emerged as the euro in 
1999 and came into circulation on January 1, 2002. Monetary authorities represent-
ing more and less stable monetary regimes negotiated the conditions for the common 
currency. Countries like Germany, Austria, the Netherlands or Belgium had more 
stable currencies, while the Mediterranean countries had a reputation of inflationary 
currencies. The newborn was a compromise between stable and inflationary curren-
cies. The five convergence or Maastricht criteria reflected the situation - they were 
more relaxed than expected in order to allow weaker currencies to qualify for the 
eurozone. Individual eurozone countries’ inflation rates were not to exceed the aver-
age inflation of the three EU countries with the lowest inflation rates, plus 1,5 per-
centage points. Budgetary deficits were not to exceed 3% of each country’s gross 
domestic product (GDP). Public debt was to be under 60% of GDP. Long term inter-
est rates were not to exceed more than 2 percentage points of the average of the three 
EU countries with the lowest interest rates. Finally, the currency under qualification 
for the eurozone should not fluctuate more than ±15% relative to a basket of major 
currencies at least two years before joining the eurozone. The eurozone would be 
created in 1999 if at least seven out of 15 EU members qualify for it in 1997 and 
1998.  
At the time of discussing and designing the criteria of the eurozone, some 
concerns emerged that were related to their consistency and suitability. For example, 
it is said, one monetary policy cannot fit to individual eurozone economies in differ-
ent cycles. If one economy expands, it needs a restrictive monetary policy; if another 
economy contracts, it needs a relaxed monetary policy. One currency may naturally 
follow one monetary policy only. The rate of 4,75% may be too high for an economy 
in contraction, while the rate of 1,0% may be too relaxed for an overheated economy. 
Second, there were doubts among monetary economists whether the eurozone repre-
sents an optimal currency area. This problem was underestimated during the creation 
of the eurozone, as we will see in part D.  
Probably the single largest constructive problem of the euro criteria was not 
discussed at the time of criteria design: an inconsistent budgetary rule of maximum 
deficit of -3% coupled with a public debt limit of 60%. On the one hand, if a deficit 
of up to -3% of GDP is allowed in economically bad years and if it is annulled by 
surpluses in economically good years, then the budget would be balanced over a pe-
riod of time. If this is so, there would be no public debt over a long period of time, so 
the public debt limit of 60% is superfluous. Inherited debt would eventually be paid 
back after some time, so there would be no public debt. On the other hand, if gov-
ernments may create deficits of up to -3% every year, then the public debt would 
permanently rise. Depending on the level where it was in some country before join-
ing the eurozone and the tempo of creating new debts, public debt would surpass the 
limit of 60% after some time and would continue to grow ad infinitum. Conse-
quently, if governments may be indebted up to -3% every year, the limit of 60% is 
ineffective and again superfluous.
3  
                                                        
3 Cf. Marek Dabrowski and Jacek Rostowski (2006); Prokopijević (2005, 2009).  371  Euro Crisis 
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At the time of negotiating the Maastricht criteria there was no answer as to 
what happens if some country violates some of the four first mentioned criteria
4 after 
joining the eurozone. That shortcoming was solved with the adoption of the Stability 
and Growth Pact
5 in 1997, initiated by Germany. The Pact envisaged fines for the 
violation of the budgetary deficit rule only. If some country violates other criteria, 
the European Central Bank and European Commission may issue a public warning, 
possibly damaging the reputation of the country but absent other disciplinary effects. 
Concerning the budgetary rule, the solution was as it follows. If a eurozone country’s 
GDP falls less than -0,75% in a year, the fine for a violation of the budgetary rule 
would be automatic. If GDP falls between -0,75% and -2%, the European Council 
and Commission (and not the ECB!) would consider the case and make a decision. If 
GDP falls more than -2%, there would be no fine, because this means the country is 
in deep recession and under such circumstances, the budgetary deficit may under-
standably exceed the limit of -3%. Fines were defined as financial and might reach 
up to 0,5% of the country’s GDP.
6 The Pact said nothing about the possibility the 
whole eurozone succumbs to a deep recession for several years. This is naturally a 
larger shortcoming in the regulation. The main puzzle: countries may be fined, but 
cannot be excluded from the eurozone if they deeply and in several consecutive years 
break heavily the budgetary rule, putting the whole eurozone at risk. Eurocrats ap-
parently felt such an outcome impossible. The current crisis demonstrates how short 
sighted regulators were. 
It turned out easier to define the rules of the eurozone than to conduct a regu-
lar race for criteria fulfillment. If we omit the criterion of currency fluctuation - 
which cannot be violated once a country abandons their national currency and enters 
the eurozone - and consider the four others, 60 criteria were to be fulfilled per year 
(four criteria times 15 EU members). In 1997, only 46 criteria were fulfilled; in 1998, 
some 50. In 1997 and 1998, only three countries fulfilled all criteria: Finland, France 
and Luxembourg.
7 All other countries were short at least one criterion. Three coun-
tries (Denmark, Sweden and United Kingdom) were not interested in joining the eu-
rozone, Greece was far from fulfilling the criteria, and thus, 11 countries entered the 
eurozone on January 1, 1999: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Greece joined in January 
2001, Slovenia in January 2007, Cyprus and Malta in January 2008, and Slovakia in 
January 2009. Presently, the eurozone encompasses 16 states.   
The qualification for the eurozone was irregular for several reasons, some im-
portant for what later unfolds. First, Belgium and Italy were admitted to join the eu-
rozone, although each ran huge public debts, exceeding 120% of GDP. The ECB 
recommended they not join, but the European Council - the heads of governments or 
presidents of member states - turned down the recommendation, stating the eurozone 
would make little sense if it excluded some of the six founding EC members. An ad-
                                                        
4 After abandoning its own currency and entering the eurozone, there is no national currency to fluctuate.  
5 Cf. EUR-lex – Access to European Union Law (2010).  
6 Countries that violate the budgetary rule make a non-interest bearing deposit and it is converted into a 
fine if, in the Councils opinion, the excessive deficit has not been corrected after two years.  
7 Cf. Prokopijević (2009), pp. 322-323.  372  Miroslav Prokopijević 
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ditional rule was introduced to limit the damage following this decision: if some 
countries have debt over 60% of GDP, it should be declining (i.e., it should decrease 
from year to year until it falls to under the recommended 60%). Second, a gentle-
man’s agreement among EU authorities excluded some debts from the general public 
debt in order to qualify. For example, Belgium and Portugal did not count their social 
security debt in 1997’s public debt. Short term loans in Denmark and trade credits 
and guarantees in France were excluded from public debt. Gold reserves in Germany 
were “reevaluated” in order to reduce public debt, etc. All these operations were con-
sidered “creative accounting”. Basically, the term was misused because “creative 
accounting” covers accounting practices neither allowed nor prohibited, while these 
operations were clearly moves to get around the rules.  
If a game begins in violation of convened rules, one may expect violations 
will continue when it is played. This is exactly what happened in the eurozone from 
1999 on. Bearing in mind the only punishable criterion - budgetary balance - the 
years 1999, 2000 and 2001 were good for the eurozone and its members. In 1999 and 
2000, no country violated the budgetary rule; in 2001, three did (Greece, Italy and 
Portugal). Deterioration marked the period 2002-2005. In 2002, France and Germany 
did the rule wrong; in 2003, France, Germany, Italy and Holland; in 2004, Austria, 
France, Germany, Italy and Portugal; and in 2005, Germany, Italy and Portugal. 
Greece violated the budgetary rule every year of its eurozone membership but 2006.
8  
It is difficult to say why euro countries kept discipline well in the first years 
after the eurozone’s creation and why they lost discipline in 2002 and thereafter. It 
may be that there was again some “gentleman’s agreement” behind the scene. Some 
countries held elections and the political cycle typically leads to higher public spend-
ing. But most interesting, Germany - always considered an example of fiscal and 
monetary discipline - heavily violated the budgetary rule in several years. Why did 
Germany change its behavior after switching from the mark to the euro? Apparently, 
the rules of the game provided different incentives in two situations. If you spend 
more and deepen the budgetary deficit when you have your own currency, you desta-
bilize your price system and undermine your future growth rate. If you escalate defi-
cits while under a common currency, you spread the inflationary and stagnation ef-
fects throughout the common currency zone. Just a fraction of negative effects spread 
through the country that escalated its deficit; the rest is spread throughout the entire 
eurozone. Public choice theorists would say one of two things. In the first case, Ger-
man voters and politicians profit in the short run (higher expenditures), but will pay 
the cost later on (higher inflation, lower growth rate). In the second case, German 
politicians and voters profit in the short run (higher expenditures and transfers), but 
will pay just a fraction of the ensuing costs because they are spread throughout the 
eurozone - other countries bear a major part of the cost. Such a game cannot go on 
forever. If France and Germany may violate the rule, other members would follow 
suit, leading to huge illegitimate and excessive expenditures and probably the end of 
the common currency after some time.  
 
                                                        
8 For more details, see Prokopijević (2009), p. 334; or “Public balance” data at Eurostat, 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu   373  Euro Crisis 
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In order to avert such a disastrous scenario, finance ministers met very fre-
quently in Brussels during 2004-5. It turned out they were unable to recommend fi-
nancial fines for violators, but they recommended all countries settle their “prob-
lems” in some timeframe, with the very last deadline in 2011 for the Greek public 
debt. That political action - combined with flourishing markets - is responsible for 
solid budgetary discipline in the eurozone during 2006 and 2007. Only Italy and Por-
tugal violated the budgetary rule in 2006 and only Greece in 2007.  
 
2. Irregularities During Crisis 
 
Economic crisis arrived in Europe in August 2008 and changed the economic and 
fiscal picture. Sharp decline in economic activity undermined public finances. All 
eurozone countries are expected to exceed the limit of -3% by far in 2009-10 (see 
Table 1). Finland was the only country expected to be below the budgetary limit in 
2009, while no country is expected to obey the rule in 2010.  
 
Table 1   General Government Balance in the Eurozone Countries, in % of GDP 
 
Country 1999  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Eurozone  -1,4 0,0 -1,9 -2,6 -3,1 -2,9 -2,5 -1,3 -0,6 -2,0 -6,3 -6,6 
Austria  -2,3 -1,7 0,0 -0,7 -1,4 -4,4 -1,6 -1,6 -0,6 -0,4 -3,4 -5,6 
Belgium -0,6  0,0  0,4  -0,1  -0,1  -0,3 -2,7 0,3 -0,2 -1,2 -6,0 -6,3 
Cyprus  -4,3 -2,3 -2,2 -4,4 -6,5 -4,1 -2,4 -1,2 3,4  0,9 -6,1 -6,3 
Finland  1,6 6,9 5,0 4,1 2,6 2,4 2,8 4,0 5,2 4,5 -2,2 -4,2 
France  -1,8 -1,5 -1,5 -3,1 -4,1 -3,6 -2,9 -2,3 -2,7 -3,4 -7,5 -7,1 
Germany  -1,5 1,3 -2,8 -3,7 -4,0 -3,8 -3,3 -1,6 0,2  0,0 -3,3 -4,6 
Greece  -  -3,7 -4,5 -4,8 -5,6 -7,5 -5,2 -2,9 -3,7 -7,7  -13,6 -7,1 
Ireland  2,7 4,8 0,9 -0,4 0,4 1,4 1,7 3,0 0,3 -7,2  -14,3  -13,3 
Italy  -1,7 -0,8 -3,1 -2,9 -3,5 -3,5 -4,3 -3,3 -1,5 -2,7 -5,3 -5,6 
Luxembourg  3,4 6,0 6,1 2,1 0,5 -1,1 0,0 1,3 3,7 2,5 -0,7 -4,4 
Malta  -7,7 -6,2 -6,4 -5,5 -9,9 -4,7 -2,9 -2,6 -2,2 -4,7 -3,8 -4,4 
Holland  0,4  2,0 -0,2 -2,1 -3,1 -1,7 -0,3 0,5  0,2  0,7 -5,3 -5,7 
Portugal  -2,8 -2,9 -4,3 -2,8 -2,9 -3,4 -6,1 -3,9 -2,6 -2,7 -9,4 -7,3 
Slovakia  -7,4 -12,3 -6,5  -8,2  -2,8  -2,4 -2,8 -3,5 -1,9 -2,3 -6,8 -4,4 
Slovenia  -3,0 -3,7 -4,0 -2,5 -2,7 -2,2 -1,4 -1,3 0,0 -1,8 -5,5 -5,6 
Spain  -1,4 -1,0 -0,6 -0,5 -0,2 -0,3 1,0  2,0  1,9 -4,1  -11,2  -12,5 
 
Source: Eurostat (1999-2008)9; For 2009 cf. Eurostat (2010)10; Forecast for 2010, see International Monetary Fund (2009), p. 17.  
 
 
                                                        
9 Eurostat. 1999-2008. Public balance. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu (accessed March 1, 2010). 
10 Eurostat. 2010. News release, 55/2010.  http://ec.europa.eu/portugal/pdf/ impren-
sa/indicadores_estatisticas_2010/20100422_55_eurostat_en.pdf (accessed April 22, 2010). 374  Miroslav Prokopijević 
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If it is clear the -4,5% fall in euro area GDP in 2009 may justify a budgetary 
deficit of -6,3%, how it is to justify an expected 2010 deficit of -6,6%, if the expected 
fall in GDP is only -0,1%? The rule is that a fall of GDP for more than -2% justifies a 
deficit surpassing -3%. There may be several reasons for this inelasticity of deficits. 
First, countries have not adjusted their current expenditures - like salaries, pensions, 
transfers and public procurements - to lower revenues. Second, due to a rise in lay-
offs, more people get unemployment compensation and this expenditure is higher. 
Third, the fiscal stimulus in the euro area in 2009 and 2010 is estimated to be at least 
2% of GDP per year. Fourth, governments have issued guarantees for different types 
of commercial activities in the private sector. Fifth, rising risks in debt service 
enlarged risk spreads, making debt service and borrowing more costly for a majority 
of euro area countries. Finally, a combination of these factors may also explain the 
deficit inelasticity. 
Poor economic performance and an inability to adjust public finances to the 
situation lead to a sharp deterioration in public finances in the eurozone countries. 
The European Commission expects in 2010 all eurozone countries to exceed the debt 
limit of 60% (except for Finland, Slovakia and Slovenia).
11 A very rapid rise in pub-
lic debt of eurozone countries is worrying. At the end of 2008, public debt for the 
whole zone was 69,3% of GDP and rose in 2009:Q1 to 72,7%, in Q2 to 75,9%, and 
in Q3 to 77,6%.
12 Public debt of the eurozone for 2009 reached 78,7%.
13 With an 
average rise per quarter of 2,7 percentage points in 2009, public debt in the eurozone 
will exceed 84% in 2010 by far (the forecasted figure of the EC and non market 
funds like the IMF and the World Bank). The figure is already terrifying enough, 
saying nothing of the larger. 
Some countries of the euro area may face a vicious circle of higher debt and 
higher interest rates. This will be fostered by two factors. First, investors will pro-
gressively abandon risky bonds of some states; to induce demand, such countries 
must offer higher interest rates. The more countries enter “risky” territory, the more 
intense competition among them will be, driving interest rates to dangerous heights. 
Second, reference interest rates are now lower due to the policies of the ECB, the 
U.S. Federal Reserve (Fed) and other large central banks that kept them low
14 during 
the crisis. In some periods, they even were negative in the real terms. When eco-
nomic recovery begins one day, inflationary pressures will rise and central banks 
(including the ECB) will be forced to raise interest rates, making both doing business 
and servicing debt more expensive. Under such conditions, some heavily indebted 
euro area countries may face defaults. 
                                                        
11 European Commission (2009), p. 44. 
12 European Central Bank. 2009. Quarterly debt and change in debt. 
http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/reports.do?node=100000318 (accessed March 7, 2010).   
13 Eurostat. 2010. News release 55, April 22, 2010. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu (accessed April 25, 
2010).  
14 ECB settled rates as follows: deposit facility at 0,25%, main refinancing operation at 1,00% and mar-
ginal lending facility at 1,75% for more than for an year. This solution prevailed at the beginning of 
March 2010. Inflation rate of the eurozone rose from -0,3% in September 2009, to 1,0% in January and 
1,5% in April 2010, and this development may indicate rising interest rates may happen soon. Cf. Euros-
tat. 2010. News release 58/2010, April 30. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu (accessed May 2, 2010).  375  Euro Crisis 
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Before considering how to fix the rising debt and deficit problems in the euro-
zone, let us briefly elaborate the question, is inflation a good option. It would mean 
to pursue policies that boost prices and wages and erode value of the currency, while 
keeping interest rates low. There are several reasons why inflation is not a solution. 
First, inflation may initially reduce a small part of debt. However, the debt burden 
would remain and the negative effects of inflation could create a whole set of new 
problems. Second, inflation would make future debt service more expensive, because 
inflation tends to push up interest rates. Markets are going to charge higher interest 
rates. Third, some countries circulate inflation protected securities, with maturities of 
5 to 20 years. Higher inflation would mean costlier debt service. In summary, higher 
inflation undermines price stability, reduces economic growth, increases social and 
political stress and adds strain on all, especially the poor. For these reasons inflation 
is not solution for the eurozone.  
 
3. How to Fix the Problem 
 
Several initiatives may help heavily indebted countries ease their financial problems:   
 
  External bail outs;  
  Expenditure cuts; 
  Revenue increases; or  
  Economic recovery. 
 
Some combination may also help, but none are easily accessible or available at 
low cost. Options mentioned above assume the country in trouble remains in the eu-
rozone. There is also another option, leaving the eurozone for some time. Let us con-
sider them in order.  
Bail outs are motivated in at least two ways. First, the crisis in one eurozone 
country affects the whole zone via loss of credibility and the common currency de-
valuation. Second, debt of the state facing default is spread in commercial banks 
throughout the eurozone. For example, if German banks hold € 28bn of Greek debt, 
the choice of the German government is either to help Greece now or to help German 
banks later on. Despite, bail out is a very limited option and is not easily negotiable 
among the euro partners. One may imagine a bail out in the case of one smaller coun-
try like Greece or Portugal, but such an operation in the case of PIIGS is impossible. 
The PIIGS, with Belgium and eventually some other country in the queue, is too big 
for such a rescue operation. It is even questionable whether Spain’s bail out is feasi-
ble having in mind the size of its economy and its debt.
15 Bail out has some conse-
quences. First, by helping to one country, other PIIGS will neglect domestic reform 
and rely on foreign assistance. Second, bail out costs countries providing help by 
worsening their budgetary positions. If they are already under -3,0% of budgetary 
deficit, this adversely affects both its and the position of the eurozone. Third, bail out 
spreads the message weak financial discipline pays off, because others will cover the 
costs, while domestic politicians and interest groups accrue the benefits. Fourth, this 
option is not easy to sell in countries providing assistance, because tax payers may 
                                                        
15 Spanish debt is € 950bn, i.e., 91% of its GDP.  376  Miroslav Prokopijević 
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turn against their government for helping another country whose government heavily 
misbehaved
16 in the past. Fifth, other countries may not be ready to provide financial 
assistance to a country in question until the country conducts some reforms to im-
prove its growth and fiscal position. The credibility for such a reform move is low, as 
we will see shortly. In summary, a bail out is an option when the economy in ques-
tion is rather small, yet it is accompanied by a number of negative consequences.
17   
Another opportunity to address difficulties in the eurozone countries is cutting 
costs to improve budget positions. The reasons for this are discussed above. The EU 
expects Spain to continue with a deficit surpassing -12% in 2010, so cuts in this case 
do not look likely in the medium term. Greece promised to cut its budgetary deficit 
from -12,7% in 2009
18 to 2,0% in 2013. Such a drastic improvement has never hap-
pened in a developed country in Europe. Table 2 presents more details on Greek fis-
cal woes.  
 
Table 2   Greek Public Borrowing Needs, € bn 
 
  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
GDP (2009 revised) 
GDP growth  
Government deficit  
Government deficit as % of GDP  
Debt maturities  
Gross borrowing needs  
YTD debt issuance  
Remaining gross borrowing needs 
240,1
-1,2% 
30,5 
-12,7% 
 
239,4
-0,3% 
21,2 
-8,7% 
30,2 
53,2 
8,0 
45,2 
243,0
1,5% 
14,2 
-5,6% 
30,3 
44,6 
 
44,6 
247,6
1,9% 
7,2 
-2,8% 
31,8 
39,0 
 
39,0 
253,8 
2,5% 
5,6 
-2,0% 
24,8 
30,4 
 
30,4 
 
Source: Greek Ministry of Finance (2010)19. 
 
Now, if a country fails to act when its budgetary problems are growing and 
general economic conditions are more favorable, is it likely to behave better when 
economic troubles are larger and when a bail out is conditioned upon broader fiscal 
improvement? If a country internationalizes its problem, it creates the expectation 
others will solve its problem. This eradicates inclination for deeper reform inside the 
country. Since something should be done inside the country, half hearted reform may 
                                                        
16 For example, the Greek government cheated the ECB and the whole world 2001-2005 by depicting 
budgetary deficits in the range -1,0% and -2,0%, while EU inspection found out it moved -5,0% and -
8,0%. In 2009 the Greece conservative government repeated the mistake by declaring budgetary deficit to 
be around -7,0%, while it turned out to be -12,7%. When the Greek debt crisis was in focus, the New 
York Times reported Goldman Sachs helped the country to get money in exchange for selling rights on 
revenues on airport and lottery until 2019. Cf. New York Times (2010).  
17 Eurozone arranged a financial assistance for Greece of € 110bn in March 2010, and for other troubled 
countries of € 750bn in April 2010. The assistance should last for next three years. It buys some time 
provided the eurozone is able to redefine and enforce the rules, what is again unlikely. Otherwise, it will 
postpone financial troubles and countries’s bankrupcies. Current Greek public debt is 118% of GDP, and 
in three years it will be at minimum 150%. To everybody is clear that this level is not servicable for 
Greece, without restructuring the debt.  
18 Eurostat corrected the figure to 13,6% with possibility for a further correction of up 0,3-0,5 percentage 
points. Cf. Eurostat. 2010. GDP, government deficit and debt in the EU. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu 
(accessed April 22, 2010).  
19 Greek Ministry of Finance. 2010. Greek Public Borrowing Needs. http://www.mnec.gr/en/ (accessed 
January 10, 2010). 377  Euro Crisis 
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be the best case result. Greece demonstrates this after getting financial assistance in 
March 2010. Eventual sharper austerity measures may induce social unrest and 
enlarge political troubles.  
If cutting expenditures is not an option, higher revenues may improve the fis-
cal position of a country in difficulty. This basically means higher taxes. Customs are 
abolished internally and fixed externally due to the EU customs union, excise duties 
are partially harmonized; what remains from larger sources are the Value Added Tax 
(VAT), individual income tax and corporate profit tax. These sources are responsible 
for more than 75% of revenues in the EU15. The PIIGS have some room for a higher 
VAT, because the VAT rates were in April 2010 in Portugal and Italy 20%, Ireland 
21%, Greece 19% and Spain 16%. The highest VAT rate in the EU27 is 25% and its 
height is not limited. However, higher VAT rates undermine economic activity and 
induce higher inflation. Concerning individual and corporate income tax
20, less room 
exists because they are already high in the PIIGS. Higher taxes generally reduce eco-
nomic activity, currently stagnant even without higher taxes (illustrated in Table 3). 
 
Table 3   Growth Rates in the Euro Area 
 
Country 2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
Euro area  2,9  2,7  0,7  -4,2  0,3 
Austria 3,5  3,5  2,0  -3,8  0,3 
Belgium 3,0  2,8  1,0  -3,2  0,0 
Cyprus 4,1  4,4  3,6  -0,5  0,8 
Finland 4,9  4,2  1,0  -6,4  0,9 
France 2,4  2,3  0,3  -2,4  0,9 
Germany 3,2  2,5  1,2  -5,3  0,3 
Greece 4,5  4,0  2,9  -0,8  -0,1 
Ireland 5,4  6,0  -3,0  -7,5  -2,5 
Italy 2,0  1,6  -1,0  -5,1  0,2 
Luxembourg 6,4  5,2  0,7  -4,8  -0,2 
Malta 3,8  3,7  2,1  -2,1  0,5 
Netherlands 3,4  3,6  2,0  -4,2  0,7 
Portugal 1,4  1,9  0,0  -3,0  0,4 
Slovakia 8,5  10,4  6,4  -4,7  3,7 
Slovenia 5,9  6,8  3,5  -4,7  0,7 
Spain 4,0  3,6  0,9  -3,8  -0,7 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund (2009), p. 6; for 2009 estimates, for 2010 forecasts. 
 
Even if one accepts overly optimistic IMF forecasts for the eurozone presented 
above, it is not difficult envisioning what will happen in the PIIGS if the VAT and 
                                                        
20 Taxation and Customs Union – European Commission. 2010. Electronic Databases. 
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other important taxes are significantly higher. Euphemistically, it will put downward 
pressure on economic activity (i.e., it will slow economic activity for years).
21 Higher 
taxes mean less investment, less investment means lower productivity growth and 
fewer jobs, and fewer jobs means lower demand, and so on along the downward spi-
ral. The certainty of such poor development is a factor to explain why authorities in 
some PIIGS and elsewhere hesitate to take this medicine.  
Economic recovery would be the best option, since economic expansion 
would generate higher revenues, but is not available at the moment due to the ongo-
ing economic crisis. Investment flourished in some PIIGS a decade ago, while now 
investors hesitate to go there or even leave countries. Out of five PIIGS, two experi-
enced economic boom (Ireland, Spain), one saw moderate development (Greece) and 
two stagnated (Italy, Portugal) during 1999-2008. Ireland prospered because it con-
ducted larger pro-market reforms from the mid 1980s to 2006. This attracted inves-
tors especially in the tradable sector. Spain saw larger investment but was driven by 
the non-tradable sector (real estate, construction, services). Some authors assume the 
investment boom resulted from Spanish membership in the eurozone and signifi-
cantly lower borrowing costs (Paul Krugman 2010). If so, why did capital inflow not 
happen in Portugal and Greece, also profiting from lower borrowing costs after enter-
ing the eurozone and also with attractive coastal locations? Alternatively, competi-
tion among Spanish regions and municipalities to attract real estate investment may 
explain capital inflow. It was a decisive factor in the Spanish boom. Italy and Portu-
gal were unable to conduct reforms and thus stagnated from the 1990s on. 
In part D, I consider the main problems for the PIIGS to recover. The core is 
in the conjunction of labor market rigidity and a rapid rise in labor costs.  
Another option for a country in trouble is to leave the eurozone until it settles 
the financial problems and return to the zone after it again satisfies the convergence 
criteria. How helpful is this for the eurozone on the one side and for a country’s 
economy on the other side? Before the EU authorities decide to exclude a country 
from the eurozone, they should consider the following question: is it probable the 
excluded country - due to this move - will undergo greater political and economic 
instability adversely affecting the whole EU? It is naturally difficult to obtain a firm 
and reliable answer, because it would be a first in history and there is no control case, 
since experiments in history are impossible.  
Eventually, the excluded country may affect the eurozone and the rest of the 
EU in two ways. First, Greek debt for example, is held by EU banks. According to 
some estimates 40% of this debt is in German and French banks. Some banks would 
face losses and national governments should bail them out. (Otherwise, banks would 
collapse and eventually poison the rest of the banking system in a county.) Second, 
exports from the EU to Greece would be reduced, sending recessive waves through-
out the EU.  
                                                        
21 Until September 2010, Italy and Ireland kept the VAT rates unchaged, while Portugal (21%), Spain 
(18%) and Greece (23%) shifted them upwards. This move in Greece induced annual inflation rate of 
5,5% and decline of GDP of 5% on the annual basis. The later was facilitated by other spending cuts as 
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The exclusion of a troublemaker from the eurozone would boost the common 
currency on the financial markets. This will happen less due to the reduced pressure 
of the country’s debt to common currency. More important would be the signal of 
improving discipline in the eurozone. The main problem is how to exclude a country 
from the eurozone if serious violations of its rules were never punished before and if 
there is not a procedure for exclusion now?   
Let us now turn to the point of view of a troubled economy. If a country exits 
the eurozone, it will face a larger cost of reintroducing a national currency. Although 
this cost is high, it is a minor problem. A greater problem is the country’s risk will 
rise, negatively affecting both interest rates for commercial activity and for new pub-
lic debts. Salaries and pensions may be inflated, relaxing public finance from this 
burden. The degree of relaxation depends on the government’s ability to resist pres-
sure from unions and other interest groups. Via inflation and depreciation of national 
currency the country may regain competitiveness of its economy. This is the way to 
induce more investment, curb economy, exports and the standard of living. This will 
not happen overnight - it will require at least several years, and probably more than a 
decade. To survive such a diet would not be easy at all. However, the country cannot 
inflate its debt because it is denominated in euro bonds. On the contrary, in the case 
of higher inflation in national currency, more national units would be needed to ser-
vice every euro of debt. All in all, this option is good for the eurozone and less good 
for the country in question. For the country in question, it would be better to stay in 
the eurozone and to regain its competitiveness via deregulation of the labor market, 
lower salaries and layoffs.  
If the conclusion is it is better to keep the troubled economy in the eurozone, 
options 1-4 and their combinations are left. In the end, if nothing from 1-4 plus exit 
option work, the country may default. Such a case is not envisioned by the conver-
gence criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact, and it is difficult to figure out what 
would happen both with that country and the eurozone.  
 
4. Obstacles: Rigidities of the Labor Market 
 
In order to obtain an answer to the question why it is now not likely larger invest-
ment will plague the PIIGS and so provide a good exit out of public finance woes, let 
us consider their competitiveness. In doing so, let us ignore other elements of the 
business environment and check inflation and labor cost figures for the eurozone.  
 
Table 4   Annual Average Inflation Rate in the Eurozone Countries, in % 
 
Country  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Euro-zone  1,2 1,2 2,2 2,4 2,3 2,1 2,2 2,2 2,2 2,1 2,3 0,3 
Austria  0,8 0,5 2,0 2,3 1,7 1,3 2,0 2,1 1,7 2,2 3,2 0,4 
Belgium  0,9 1,1 2,7 2,4 1,6 1,5 1,9 2,5 2,3 1,8 4,5 0,0 
Cyprus  2,3 1,1 4,9 2,0 2,8 4,0 1,9 2,0 2,2 2,2 4,4 0,2 
Finland  1,3 1,3 2,9 2,7 2,0 1,3 0,1 0,8 1,3 1,6 3,9 1,6 
France  0,7 0,6 1,8 1,8 1,9 2,2 2,3 1,9 1,9 1,6 3,2 0,1 
Germany  0,6 0,6 1,4 1,9 1,4 1,0 1,8 1,9 1,8 2,3 2,8 0,2 380  Miroslav Prokopijević 
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Greece  4,5 2,1 2,9 3,7 3,9 3,4 3,0 3,5 3,3 3,0 4,2 1,3 
Ireland  2,1 2,3 5,3 4,0 4,7 4,0 2,3 2,2 2,7 2,9 3,1 -1,7 
Italy  2,0 1,7 2,6 2,3 2,6 2,8 2,3 2,2 2,2 2,0 3,5 0,8 
Luxembourg  1,0 1,0 3,8 2,4 2,1 2,5 3,2 3,8 3,0 2,7 4,1 0,0 
Malta  3,7 2,3 3,0 2,5 2,6 1,9 2,7 2,5 2,6 0,7 4,7 1,8 
Netherlands  1,8 2,0 2,3 5,1 3,9 2,2 1,4 1,5 1,7 1,6 2,2 1,0 
Portugal  2,2 2,2 2,8 4,4 3,7 3,3 2,5 2,1 3,0 2,4 2,7 -0,9 
Slovakia  6,7  10,4  12,2  7,2 3,5 8,4 7,5 2,8 4,3 1,9 3,9 0,9 
Slovenia  7,9 6,1 8,9 8,6 7,5 5,7 3,7 2,5 2,5 3,8 5,5 0,9 
Spain  1,8 2,2 3,5 2,8 3,6 3,1 3,1 3,4 3,6 2,8 4,1 -0,3 
 
Source: Eurostat (2010)22. 
 
Inflation increased more in the PIIGS than in any country of the eurozone in 
the period of euro membership. Inflation in Portugal, 1998-2009, amounted to 30,4 
percentage points, Italy 27,0pp, Ireland 33,1pp, Greece 29,3pp (since 2001), and 
Spain 33,7pp. On the other side, cumulative inflation in Germany in the period 1998-
2009 was 16,7pp, and in Austria 20,2pp. There is a large gap between inflation in the 
PIIGS and in countries like Germany and Austria. A rapid rise in the general level of 
prices reduced competitiveness of the PIIGS. However, if one adds the change in 
labor costs for Germany and the PIIGS in the period 1997-2008, the results even 
more worrying. German labor costs rose cumulatively over the period for 23,7pp, 
Greek 77,2pp, Spanish 54,7pp and Portuguese 40,0pp.
23 In other words, prices rose 
in the PIIGS more than in stable euro economies; labor costs rose even more and the 
consequence is the PIIGS lost an important fraction of their competitiveness. Low 
competitiveness will divert larger investment in the tradable sector from these coun-
tries elsewhere. This reduces the probability of an economic recovery in the PIIGS. 
Countries from South Europe have had the problem of competitiveness even 
before the introduction of the euro. But at that time, they had their national currencies 
and by devaluing them they improved their competitiveness. As a result, monetary 
policy was inflationary, i.e. these countries had significantly higher inflation rates 
than Germany, Benelux or Scandinavian countries. Higher inflation was the result of 
union and interest group pressure on wage policy and rigidities in the labor market. 
Unions and interest groups pushed for higher wages, the government conceded, and 
in such a situation, inflation was the only instrument to control production costs. 
When inflation reduces salaries and pensions over some period of time, unions and 
interest groups renew their activity, pursue higher salaries and pensions, and the 
game goes on. Consequently, South European countries were endemically inflation-
ary. The introduction of euro changed the configuration. Countries may pursue infla-
tionary policy, i.e., they can reduce the value of the euro on the internal market, but 
they cannot devalue the euro because the ECB - rather than national central banks - 
                                                        
22 Eurostat. 2010. HICP, all items (Estimate for 2009). http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu (accessed March 
1, 2010).   
23 Eurostat. 2010. Labor cost index - annual data. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu (accessed March 13, 
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designs monetary policy. Higher inflation in a country raises salaries and costs in the 
country reducing the level of its competitiveness abroad. 
If the PIIGS need to recover, they need to attract more investment and create 
more jobs or better paid jobs, and to attract investment and jobs, these countries need 
to regain their competitiveness. This may be done by conducting all encompassing 
reforms of the state and business environment. However, if some country did not 
used the period of prosperity to do this, for example, 1994-2008, it is even less likely 
to conduct painful reforms in a period of economic crisis and deep recession. Is there 
any alternative?  
Sure there is, but it may be even less workable. If there should be an optimal 
currency area, as Robert Mundell defined it, at least three conditions should be ful-
filled. First, in order to be an optimal currency area, it needs to have diversified pro-
duction. Second, it has to be open to trade. Third, it needs to have mobile factors of 
production, like capital, labor, etc.
24 The eurozone satisfies the first and second con-
ditions, while it partially satisfies the third one. Capital and other factors of produc-
tion are mobile with exception of labor. The idea of an optimal currency area as-
sumes if some country or region enters economic downturn, workers go elsewhere to 
find jobs. For example, if Portugal and Spain face economic troubles, their workers 
would go to the Netherlands or Finland, where jobless rates are low and where they 
can find jobs. In the U.S. this is usual, when somebody loses her job in California or 
Florida, she goes to Texas or New Mexico. European working and living habits are 
different. If someone loses his job in Hamburg, he will only exceptionally go to 
Frankfurt to get a job. It is even more difficult for a German to move to Italy or 
Greece if Germany is stagnant and these two are prosperous at the moment. It is 
similarly difficult for Greeks or Spaniards to move to Holland or elsewhere where 
there are jobs available. High transaction costs make for poor international circula-
tion of workers on the common market. People in different countries speak different 
languages and have different habits and different social capital. According to Euro-
pean statistics, less than 5 million of the total EU15 working force live and work in a 
foreign country.  
In conclusion, workers in the eurozone and the EU do not behave along the 
expectation of optimal currency area theory. If this is so, labor market adjustment is 
localized and restricted to countries in trouble. This means adjustment is expected to 
happen in the PIIGS, implying a very difficult and costly process.  
To see why this is so, let us take the example of Spain. Other PIIGS are not 
much different. Employment in Spain is highly regulated, with the main purpose to 
protect an employee’s rights. Labor market regulations are complex. Jobs are 
grouped into categories, and each category has a different set of regulations, called 
convenio collectivo. These convenios regulate, for example, the legal salary range for 
each job, hours in a work day, vacation days per year. The following general rules 
hold for employment in Spain:   
 
  A 40-hour working week; 
  Either 14 or 16-and-a-half payments annually. If you choose 14 payments, you 
pay the monthly salary plus two extra payments; 
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  Vacation of 21 business days for each full year worked; 
  There are not sick days per se. If an employee gets sick, they must find a doc-
tor to confirm this, i.e. to sign a baja confirming they are unable to work. With 
a baja, social security takes over to pay the salary of the employee; 
  If you fire somebody, you pay 45 days of indemnification for each year the 
employee worked for you. In any case, you must pay something called fi-
naquito, which mainly covers any vacation that the employee has not taken 
while working for you;  
  The employee has a right to 15 days (including weekends) for marriage, 2 days 
for a birth of child or the death of a family member, one day for home reloca-
tion and four months for maternity leave.  
 
Having such provisos in mind, will investors rush to invest and employ work-
ers in Spain and other PIIGS? This is not likely before reforms take place in the 
PIIGS. The reforms will be costly both in economic and political senses. Both the 
state and the business environment should undergo reform. The state must cut ex-
penditures and taxes to reduce administrative burden and to cut surplus labor. The 
eurozone members from South Europe are ranked low in ratings for economic free-
dom. In The 2010 Index of Economic Freedom (The Heritage Foundation & Wall 
Street Journal 2010), ranking 179 nations of the world according to the level of eco-
nomic freedom, Spain is ranked 36
th with 69,6 out of 100 possible index points, Por-
tugal 62
nd (64,4), Greece 73
rd (62,7) and Italy 74
th (62,7). As a rule, these four coun-
tries get even less points for labor market regulation: Spain 47,3 out of 100, Portugal 
37,0, Greece 55,1 and Italy 58,2 points. Labor market points are far below marks for 
economic freedom in general, confirming our previous elaboration on labor market 
rigidity. If reform tackles labor markets, the consequences would be very clear. To 
Spanish workers there will be more jobs available, but they will be less paid. Other 
employment benefits will also be much less generous, to say nothing of lower unem-
ployment protection and social security benefits being substantial components of the 
deficit in Spain. The only question is who is able to sell such a program to Spanish 
voters. It is not much different in other PIIGS.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
Troubles in the eurozone are neither sudden nor surprising. The rules were violated 
from the zone’s inception and nearly throughout its eleven year history. However, 
violations of the budgetary rule and public debt were moderate during years of eco-
nomic prosperity in Europe (1999-2008). High state expenditures were covered by 
rising budgetary revenues from growing economies. The picture changed dramati-
cally since summer 2008, when the current economic recession arrived in Europe and 
the eurozone countries. Budgetary deficits reached double digits in several countries 
of the eurozone while public debt sky rocketed. Debt service became more difficult 
and the risk of default higher.  
The main problem is the currency is highly politicized from the start. Creating 
the eurozone was a political decision; allowing Belgium, Greece and Italy to join 
with huge debt was a political decision; tolerating “creative accounting” was a politi-
cal decision; not to exclude violators of rules was a political decision. The decision to 383  Euro Crisis 
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keep the PIIGS inside is political, as well as the decision to help some countries. In 
such a context, the euro will continue to be highly politicized, enhancing rather than 
reducing risks in the eurozone.  
Threats to the euro are serious and for the first time in its short life, may be fa-
tal. The single largest threat is a lack of discipline in the eurozone. The inability to 
exclude troublemakers in the past and now indicates discipline will be eroded rather 
than improved. If the case of Greece indicates to the PIIGS how the eurozone will 
behave when they enter the “Greek scenario”, this would be a signal of larger prob-
lems. Greek default cannot blow up the eurozone, but a default of several PIIGS can. 
If countries in larger financial trouble like the PIIGS are excluded, the euro-
zone may manage to survive as a small currency area around Germany. If the PIIGS 
stay inside and their troubles grow, Germany and some other countries may consider 
an exit option. One option would be the euro disappears as common currency and all 
members reintroduce national currencies. Options available for the eurozone coun-
tries in trouble are conditioned either upon complicated and costly domestic adjust-
ments, risky moves (to leave eurozone temporary) or complicated international nego-
tiations (external bailouts). 
The only impossible outcome from this crisis would consist in the preservation 
of the current status quo, prevailing before the second half of 2010. It is impossible 
to run the eurozone as before, because it allows behavior incompatible with the long 
term sustainability of euro. The purpose of this article was to discuss options for 
countries in trouble rather than to suggest what will happen. 
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